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I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]
Transportation networks constitute “the circulatory system of our
economy.” 1
The distinct modes that constitute the American
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transportation system—air, rail, transit, highways, and waterways—impact
the entire range of our daily activities. 2 Just as the human body depends
on its circulatory system for life and well being, the United States’ vitality
would grind to a halting stop without a vibrant transportation system.
[2]
Ongoing globalization, population growth, and urbanization
continue to overload transportation systems in this country and around the
world. 3 As a result, our transportation system relies on advancing
technology and its applications to sustain its operation in response to
modern demands. 4 However, an unintended consequence of this increased
reliance on technology is the widespread collection of vehicular, personal,
and company data for the delivery of services. 5
Consequently,
concerns exist as to whether all of the personal data being collected is
actually necessary, whether it contains sensitive personal information,

† The authors would like to thank Ray D. Pethtel, Transportation Fellow and Interim
Executive Director of the I-81 Coalition, and Gene Hetherington, Doctoral Candidate and
Graduate Assistant at the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute in Blacksburg, Va. for
their generous assistance with this article. This article grew out of our research for the
previously published Policy Paper, “A Policy Review of the Impact of Existing Privacy
Principles have on Current and Emerging Transportation Safety Technology”.
1

IBM CORP., THE CASE FOR SMARTER TRANSPORTATION 2 (2010) [hereinafter IBM,
SMARTER TRANSPORTATION], available at http://www-07.ibm.com/innovation/my
/exhibit/documents/pdf/2_The_ Case_For_Smarter_Transportation.pdf.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

See id. at 5 (discussing the importance of digital technology to “model future demand,
capacity, cost and impacts”).
5

See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 296
(2004).
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such as bank account and Social Security numbers, and whether it is
managed to safeguard personal privacy. 6
[3]
Advancing technologies have increased the transportation system’s
capacities, but have also provided more opportunities and methods to
invade an individual’s privacy interests. 7 The escalating issue of personal
privacy threats caused by transportation technologies has raised questions
as to how to protect a traveler’s privacy interests, if the interests deserve
protection at all. 8 In 2009, Missouri state senator Jim Lembke introduced
a bill to ban the increasing use of red light cameras. 9 He argued: “We’ve
got a real problem with these red light cameras and how they infringe
upon our constitutional rights. Rights to privacy, rights to equal protection
under the law, rights to do [sic] process and the right to confront our
accuser.” 10
6

See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1349, 1387 (2004) (discussing how new highway technologies can provide
“invaluable information on traffic, weather, and road conditions,” but can also, in many
cases, collect personal information about the “movements and driving habits of particular
drivers”); see also Benjamin Burnham, Comment, Hitching a Ride: Every Time You Take
a Drive, the Government Is Riding with You, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1499, 1513 (2006)
(discussing how personal data collected through electronic tollway systems, such as EZPass, have been subpoenaed by private lawyers in divorce cases).
7

See Glancy, supra note 5, at 296.

8

See Frank Douma & Jordan Deckenbach, The Challenge of ITS for the Law of Privacy,
2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 328.
9

Joel O. Christensen, Note, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light
Cameras, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 443, 460-61 (2010) (discussing the presence of legal
concerns about red lights in Missouri since 2006); Press Release, Mo. Senate, Senator
Jim Lembke Introduces His First Bills in Mo. Senate (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.senate.mo.gov/09info/members/newsrel/d01/012109.pdf.
10

Outlawing Red Light Cameras Proposed in Senate Committee (NewsRadio 1120
KMOX News radio broadcast Feb. 18, 2009) (transcript on file with Missouri Digital
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[4]
Historically, the American people have held personal privacy as a
sacred value, a result of either our historical roots as British colonies or
our rugged individualism. 11 For whatever reason, the United States has a
long-standing perception that the protection of personal sensitive
information is an absolute right of citizenship. 12 That is, of course, not the
case. There is no specific constitutional right to privacy, but there are
numerous case decisions and individual statutes that bear on the question
of whether, and to what extent, a citizen’s expectation of privacy exists. 13
This article will elaborate on the question of whether a member of the
traveling public carries a legally protected privacy right in the
transportation arena.
[5]
As this article already pointed out, a vibrant transportation system
is fundamental to the commercial operations, the security, and the overall
health and vitality of the United States and its society. 14 In recent years,
News),
redlight.htm.

available

at

http://mdn.org/2009/stories/

11

See James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 169, 170
(2001) (“In the years leading to the Revolutionary War, the British used general searches
as a way to root out anti-English traitors and sympathizers. The citizens of the nascent
Republic found these searches wholly unreasonable.”); Amanda Christine Dake,
Comment, The Application of “Out-of-Hospital” Do not Resuscitate Order Legislation to
Commercial Airline Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 443, 455-56 (1997) (“[B]ecause
historically Americans have understood personal privacy to involve a ‘right to be let
alone,’ the right of privacy exemplifies basic tenets of ‘the American way of life’ and
vision of liberalism, or, rather, dedication to individualism, the rule of law, and freedom
from unwarranted governmental intrusions into individuals’ private affairs.”) (quoting
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY– ITS CONSTITUTIONAL & SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY, at ii (1980)).
12
See DAVID SADOFSKY, THE QUESTION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC POLICY: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA 1 (1993) (“Three out of four Americans were discovered to
believe the ‘right of privacy’ should be akin to the inalienable rights to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness, the traditional promises of the Declaration of Independence.”).
13

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing various Supreme Court
decisions that recognized a right to privacy under the Constitution).
14

See IBM, SMARTER TRANSPORTATION, supra note 1, at 2.
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the development of transportation-related technologies has become the
focus of more and more business operations, and with that the issue of the
legal protection of individual privacy in the face of these technological
developments has earned increased scrutiny. 15 Moreover, in the post 9/11
era, the issue of national security has focused primarily on specific
transportation modes: air, rail and highways. 16 This has placed greater
emphasis on national security which has, at times, collided with the
protection of an individual’s privacy interests while traveling. 17 This
article examines the impact that advancing transportation technology has
on the traveling public’s expectation of privacy, as well as how the United
States Supreme Court, the Congress, the courts in Virginia and the
General Assembly of Virginia have addressed privacy claims in a host of
situations. These statutory requirements and judicial opinions will be
discussed and analyzed, concluding that a critical outcome of emerging
transportation technology has been the narrowing and eroding of the scope
of legally protected privacy interests.

15

See Blitz, supra note 6, at 1387; Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 296; see also
Burnham, supra note 6, at 1499.
16

See Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching
for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 172-75 (2007). See generally John W. Whitehead
& Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A
Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's AntiTerrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1108 (2002) (examining the USA Patriot
Act's effect on private protections).
17

See Hanson, supra note 16, at 172-75 (providing examples of instances where travelers
are subjected to “suspicionless searches”).
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
[6]
Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor the Bill of Rights, contains
explicit provisions for the protection of privacy. 18 However, the Supreme
Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut famously
recognized that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras”
that “create zones of privacy.” 19 The Griswold Court noted that “facets of
privacy” appear within the First Amendment’s right of association, the
Third Amendment’s “prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any
house,’” the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable
government search and seizure, and the Fifth Amendment’s protection
from self incrimination that “enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.” 20
The Court explained that, when reading these penumbrae together with the
Ninth Amendment’s assurance that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others,” the
Constitution arguably reserves a tacit right of privacy. 21 After Griswold
and the Supreme Court’s ostensible nod in the direction of accepting a
general right to privacy, the Court seemingly has limited its Griswold
pronouncement to zones of privacy concerning familial and personal
relationships, rather than expanding the right to an individual’s control of
information dissemination. 22
Contributing further questions and
18

Roe, 410 U.S. at 172.

19

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (concluding that a state statute
criminalizing contraceptive use by married couples intruded into a zone of marital
privacy where the government may not tread).
20

Id. at 484.

21

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).

22

Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J.
643, 644 (2007) (“[T]he controversy over reproductive privacy decisions makes
expansion of [informational] privacy protections unlikely for the foreseeable future. This

6
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contradictions, constitutional scholars also disagree whether privacy
actually is a valid legal concept. 23
[7]
For example, in Katz v. United States, the Court ruled that the use
of electronic surveillance in a public telephone booth without a search
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
search and seizure and affirmed that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
extends to public places. 24 The Court later noted in United States v. Miller
that individuals had no expectation of privacy for information supplied
voluntarily for commercial uses. 25 Thereafter, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court
attempted to define a balance between the interests of privacy and the
government’s operations. 26 In Whalen, the Court ruled that New York
State had the right to collect data about individuals and create a database if
for the public good and with adequate security measures taken to protect
the privacy and identification of individuals. 27 As part of this ruling, the
Court recognized and defined what it called a “zone of privacy” in which
an individual may have the expectation of the nondisclosure of personal
is unfortunate, and even tragic, because technology for learning and disseminating highly
personal things about individuals poses an unprecedented risk of invasion of privacy.”).
23

Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
95-96, 199-206, 210-13 (1990) (“Related to . . . Tribe’s discussion of rights
of privacy and personhood . . . are rights of individual autonomy which inhere in the
Constitution because that document is claimed to have an implicit idea of what it means
to be fully human. Quite aside from the dubious nature of that assertion, Tribe’s version
of what being human is turns out to be an extreme form of modern liberalism’s moral
relativism.”), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 12-13 (1985) (“A
substantive concern for individual privacy necessarily underpins the Fourth
Amendment.”).
OF THE LAW

24

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).

25

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).

26

See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591-95, 600-02 (1977).

27

See id. at 605-06.
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matters and “independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.” 28
[8]
Relative to transportation privacy, the Court in Delaware v. Prouse
agreed that without “at least [an] articulable and reasonable suspicion that
a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of law,” law enforcement could not randomly stop vehicles to
check for valid license and registration. 29 The Court articulated that “an
individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its
use are subject to government regulation.” 30 Nonetheless, the Prouse
Court curtailed broad privacy protections for individual drivers when it
recognized that, even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
constitutionally acceptable methods for stopping vehicles exist. 31 As long
as police officers do not have “the unbridled discretion” to stop any
random vehicle, instead maintaining a systemic “[q]uestioning of all
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops,” then such stops pass
constitutional muster. 32
[9]
A mere four years following the Prouse decision, the Court
reigned in privacy protections again when it found that “[a] person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” 33 In
United States v. Knotts, the police put a tracking device on a container of
28

Id. at 598-600.

29

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).

30

Id. at 662.

31

See id. at 663.

32

Id.

33

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).

8
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chemicals picked up and transported in a car without first obtaining a
warrant. 34 Following the tracking device signal to a secluded cabin in the
woods, the police conducted visual surveillance for three days before
obtaining a search warrant for the cabin. 35 The Court took no exception to
the police’s tactics and found that the “beeper signals complained of by
respondent [did not] invade any legitimate expectation of privacy,” and
thus “there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation
of the Fourth Amendment.” 36 In response to respondent’s argument and
warning that holding in the government’s favor may mean that “twentyfour hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible,
without judicial knowledge or supervision,” 37 the Court commented that it
has “never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.” 38 Given
the compendium of the Prouse and Knotts holdings, it almost goes without
mention that the High Court has established a generally accepted maxim
that persons traveling in vehicles on public highways have significantly
diminished expectation of any right to privacy. 39
[10] These Supreme Court decisions painted the backdrop for
individual privacy protections leading up to the technological explosion,
and created, at best, a muddled legal standard for privacy. 40 This issue
34

Id. at 278-79.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 285.

37

Id. at 283.

38

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.

39

See Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity” in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned
Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 397 (1997) (“The United States Supreme
Court’s greatly diminished view of Fourth Amendment privacy protection for motorists
on public roadways is not in accord with the reality of citizens’ use and view of their
cars.”).
40

Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 656 (discussing the “unprecedented access to
information about individuals,” and the serious need for “judicial protection of a

9
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became even more complex with the development of emerging
technologies—such
as
camera-based
applications,
satellite
communications and tracking, electronic databases, and the Internet—that
facilitate the collection and storage of personal information. 41 Moreover,
in the post 9/11 era, the threats to national security by terrorist groups and
others have led to a heightened emphasis on homeland security. 42 This
focus on security has further eroded already uncertain legal protections for
an individual’s expectation of privacy in his/her personal data. 43 While
the Supreme Court has addressed several cases arising from privacy
protection challenges to technological innovation, 44 the development of
the law in the transportation arena has occurred primarily by congressional
enactments and the regulatory framework. 45
constitutional right to informational privacy and greater safeguards through tort law and
statutes”).
41

See id. (“Computerized records and databases store information in a way that it can be
accessed by others. The Internet makes it potentially available to many.”).
42

See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Homeland Security Challenges of Global Climate Change, 54
LOY. L. REV. 800, 812 (2008) (“To say ‘the world has changed after 9/11,’ is an
understatement, especially regarding the importance of making the proper access
decisions. Indeed, national awakening to this threat after 9/11 is what prompted the
placement of [Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”)] within the Department of
Homeland Security in the first place.”).
43

See, e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 16, at 1108 (examining the USA Patriot Act’s
effect on privacy protections and noting that requests to install wiretaps to record private
conversations now are “virtually never denied”).
44

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (upholding privacy expectations in
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer); Reno
v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (finding that the South Carolina department of motor
vehicles’ requirement that automobile owners provide personal information as a
condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering a vehicle, and the selling of this
personal data for revenue, are in conflict with Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
45

See Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 305 (“Although there is not a single
comprehensive privacy statute or constitutional provision in the United States, statutes
have been passed to address specific privacy concerns. In many cases, these have
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B. Federal and State Statutes and Regulations
[11] Whether there is a causal relationship between the events of 9/11
and the “explosion” of technology in the security arena is an important
analysis that is beyond the scope of this research. However, it is
incontrovertible that efforts to improve the technologies attendant to data
security, especially in the transportation arena, have given rise to
increasing concern for privacy protection. 46 The development of now
commonplace technologies such as sophisticated electronics, computers,
and the wireless Internet have provided capabilities that previous
generations could only dream of and many in our current society can
barely comprehend. 47 Whether due to the fear of the unknown or the
understanding of the known, technological advancements have triggered
citizen concern and Congress has responded with a series of enactments
which, in turn, have resulted in regulatory promulgations. 48 While an
exhaustive discussion of congressional action would prove formidable, the
following is an overview of the landscape.
[12] Title 6 of the United States Code, Domestic Security, establishes
the Department of Homeland Security. 49 Chapter 4 of Title 6 provides the
statutory framework for transportation security including: surface

stemmed from public outcry over a revealed gap in privacy laws; accordingly, they
address only those specific instances of privacy concerns.”).
46

See generally id. at 305-06, 308-10, 326.

47

Cf. Robin Cowan, High Technology and the Economics of Standardization, U. W.
ONTARIO, 12 (May 27-28, 1991), http://www.cgl.uwaterloo.ca/~racowan/High
TechStand.pdf (presented at the International Conference on Social and Institutional
Factors Shaping Technological Development: Technology at the Outset) (“It may be . . .
very difficult to predict what properties [technologies] will have in the future.”).
48

See generally Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 305 (citing as an example the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006)).
49

6 U.S.C. § 111.
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transportation security, 50 railroad security, 51 and over-the-road-bus and
trucking security. 52 In each of these areas, Congress has mandated that the
Secretary of Homeland Security identify risks and areas of vulnerability,
as well as promote research into tactics and strategies for mitigating the
risks and addressing emergency situations should they occur. 53
[13] Of particular relevance to this discussion is the language in Title 6,
wherein Congress authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to
permit “deploying, equipping, and utilizing tracking technology . . . for
motor carriers transporting security-sensitive materials” in order to collect,
display, and store information regarding the movements and locations of
shipments and vehicles. 54 Moreover, this section enables the “installation
by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices . . . activated by law
enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle or alert emergency response
resources to locate and recover security-sensitive materials . . . .” 55
[14] Included in Title 49 of the United States Code is a provision that
“the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop, prepare, implement
and update . . . (A) National Strategy for Transportation Security; and (B)
transportation modal security plans” addressing security risks including
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for “aviation, bridge and tunnel,
commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, mass transit,
50

See 6 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1208 (Supp. III 2010).

51

See id. §§ 1161-1172.

52

See id. §§ 1181-1186.

53

See id. §§ 1101-1186.

54

Id. § 1204(a)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. III 2010).

55

6 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2)(C)(v) (Supp. III 2010). This type of legislation—according to
those advocates who fear the misuse and abuse of secretly tracking motor vehicles for
any purposes—further erodes the right to privacy for all members of the traveling public.
See Glancy, supra note 5, at 295-96. The discussion will return to motor vehicle tracking
by law enforcement officials in Part III.
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over-the-road bus, and other public transportation infrastructure assets.” 56
The statute further provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Transportation Secretary shall work jointly to develop, revise and
update the National Security Strategy by identifying “transportation assets
in the United States that . . . must be protected from attack or disruption by
terrorists or other hostile forces . . . .” 57
[15] In the area of motor vehicles, traditionally a state law jurisdiction,
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) prohibits the release
and use of certain personal information from state motor vehicle records. 58
The statute prohibits the state motor vehicles department from disclosing
personal information, including photographs, social security numbers, and
any personally identifying data to any entity or person without the consent
of the individual to whom the information applies. 59 Congress did create
an exception, however, in cases where personal information is sought for
such reasons as “motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle
emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories,” or law
enforcement purposes. 60
[16] Dorothy Glancy, in her seminal discussion of privacy issues
encountered by citizens on America’s highways, concluded with a review
of a California statute that mandates automobile manufacturers to disclose
the presence of event data recorder (EDR) mechanisms in the owner’s
manuals of new automobiles manufactured after July 1, 2004, and sold or
leased in the state of California. 61 These EDR “black boxes” have the
56

49 U.S.C. § 114(s)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 2010).

57

Id. § 114(t)(3)(A).

58

18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006).

59

Id. §§ 2721, 2725(4).

60

Id. § 2721(b)(1); see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 145 (2000).

61
Glancy, supra note 5, at 374 (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (Deering, LEXIS through
2011 Sess.)).
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capacity to collect and record information from the vehicle such as speed,
direction, travel history, seatbelt use by the driver, and accident-related
data. 62 The statute further requires that data may only be released with the
consent of the owner for certain types of research about safety issues, or in
response to a lawful court order. 63 Glancy hypothesized that, given the
California statute’s level of privacy protection for EDR data, when “other
types of information derived from the activities of people on the open road
[is collected], protection for the privacy interests of roadway users will be
further reinforced.” 64
[17] Since 2004, twelve other states have enacted a statute similar to
California’s “black box” legislation, which indicates that Glancy’s
hypothesis was, at least in part, accurate. 65 As with the California statute,
these twelve state statutes require the owner’s consent prior to releasing
data. 66 Exceptions include: (1) release pursuant to a valid court order or
search warrant; (2) release for research purposes; or (3) release for
diagnostic purposes, such as servicing or repairing the motor vehicle. 67

62

Id.

63

Id. at 375.

64

Id.

65

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-107 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-402 (2010);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164aa (Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 19721973 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485 (Lexis-Nexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 357-G:1 (LexisNexis 2011); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 416-b (Consol. Supp.
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-28 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.928, .932, .935,
.938, .942, .945 (2009); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615 (West 2011); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (West Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.35.020, 0.30
(Supp. 2011).
66

See sources cited supra note 65.

67

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485(2); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-07-28(2);
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 46.35.030(1)(a)-(c).

14
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[18] The owner’s consent requirement receives additional bolstering in
Oregon and North Dakota, where state statutes prohibit insurers from
requiring the insured to provide automatic consent for the insurer to
retrieve EDR data as a condition of obtaining an insurance policy. 68
Notably, the data can be released without the owner’s consent if “[a] law
enforcement officer, firefighter or emergency medical services provider
seeks to obtain the data in the course of responding to or investigating an
emergency involving the physical injury or the risk of physical injury to
any person.” 69 Maine and Washington have similar exceptions for
releasing vehicle data in the event of medical emergencies in order to treat
injured individuals. 70
[19] A discussion of the California and other twelve state statutes sets
the background for a discussion of other federal regulations in this area. 71
The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, §§ 563.1 through 563.12,
establishes “national requirements for vehicles equipped with event data
recorders (EDRs) concerning the collection, storage, and retrievability of
onboard motor vehicle crash event data” for vehicles manufactured after
September 1, 2012. 72 Rather than protecting driver privacy, the primary
purposes of these regulations are: (1) addressing safety concerns; (2)
advancing the understanding of accident causation; and (3) developing
safer vehicle designs. 73 Section 563.11 does mandate disclosure of the
EDR device in the owner’s manual, but none of the regulatory sections
68

N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-28(6); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.932.

69

OR. REV. STAT. § 105.935.

70

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1972; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.35.030(1)(d).

71

See generally supra text accompanying notes 61–67 (discussing the hypothesis that
California and other states’ “black box” legislation will enhance driver’s information
privacy and autonomy).

72

49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1, 563.3 (2010).

73

See id. § 563.2.
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specifically require the owner’s consent to release data after an accident. 74
Although no personal data, such as name, gender, age or accident location
is recorded or released by the EDR, federal regulations explicitly
acknowledge that law enforcement officials have access to this personal
information in accident investigations, which could be combined with
EDR data without an owner’s consent. 75
[20] The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 granted the
agency the power to prevent unfair business practices, 76 which now
includes the Principles of Fair Information Practices, governing
information over the Internet. 77 The FTC describes Congress’ approach to
addressing privacy concerns as “‘sectoral,’ consisting of a handful of
disparate statutes” that address “different commercial activities [with]
different privacy issues.” 78 Once the FTC realized the privacy concerns
74

75

76

See id. § 563.11.
See id.
See Federal Trade Commissions Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 58 (2006).

77

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.
78

TO

CONGRESS, 7-8 (June 1998),

Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy &
American Business National Conference: Consumer Privacy in the Information Age: A
View From the United States (Oct. 9, 1996); see Ray D. Pethtel, James D. Phillips &
Gene Hetherington, A Policy Review of the Impact Existing Privacy Principles Have on
Current and Emerging Transportation Safety Technology, THE NAT’L SURFACE TRANSP.
SAFETY CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE, 9 (May 12, 2011), http://scholar.vt.edu/
VTTI/reports/PrivacyFinalReport05122011.pdf (“In 1998, Congress recognized that the
privacy protections provided by the FTC were inadequate, describing the situation as
‘sectoral,’ consisting of a handful of disparate statutes directed at specific industries that
collect personal data and none of which specifically cover the general collection of
personal information.”); see, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §
3402 (2006) (governing individual bank records); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681c(a) (2006) (governing consumer credit reports); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006 & Supp. II 2010) (governing the disclosure
of wire, oral, or electronic communications); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18
U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (governing video rental records); Family Educational Rights and
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inherent in such a fractured system they created the Principles of Fair
Information Practices, attempting to encourage the private sector to create
and utilize a system of self-regulation. 79 The uncertainty involved with
interpreting each of these statutes to find a common set of privacy
standards has “conspired to create an environment where any regulation of
privacy is not only open to an endless number of interpretations but also
creates a liability minefield for companies that develop, manufacture and
deploy technology that involves the collection of private information.” 80
Perhaps with the mandate from the Principles of Fair Information
Practices, the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
will “fill the void by creating regulatory systems designed to … protect
their institutional interests.” 81

Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (governing student records);
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) (current version at
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006)) (governing information
relating to use of telecommunication services; “customer proprietary network
information”); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2006)
(governing cable television subscriber information); cf. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a (2006) (governing data collected by the federal government). Pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), individuals
have no Fourth Amendment interest in personal information they voluntarily have
conveyed to another. Consequently, any privacy protections for personal information
must be legislatively grounded.
79

Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra
note 77, at 15-16.
80

Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9; see, e.g., Rebecca Dent, The Role
of Banking Regulations in Data Theft and Security, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 381, 390
(2008) (“Illinois’s Credit Card and Debit Card Liability Act would amend current Illinois
identity theft legislation to make any data collector, such as TJX, liable to any financial
institution for costs associated with identity theft originating with the data collector.”).
81

Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9-10; see FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 77, at 15 (illustrating how the “online industry” has used self-regulation to
effectively protect online privacy).
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[21] One example of such an effort was undertaken by a group of
transportation equipment manufacturers who are members of the
Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITSA). 82 Established in
1991, ITSA is a public/private partnership dedicated to promoting the
development and deployment of variety of intelligent transportation
technologies. 83 ITSA creates technology devices that apply to almost all
areas of the transportation sector. 84 In response to an increased concern
over data security, the ITSA created a task force charged with studying the
issue and offering recommendations that would address the public
concerns about how emerging transportation technology should be
regulated to best protect the public’s privacy interests. 85 After approval
from the ITSA’s Board, the principles were created as non-binding
guidelines and member organizations were not compelled to comply with
the principles, but merely to agree to take them into account in the
development process of any new technology. 86 These Privacy Principles

82

See Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 1; Membership, ITS AM.,
http://www.itsa.org/membership (last updated July. 13, 2011).

83

See About ITS America, ITS AM., http://www.itsa.org/aboutus (last updated June 24,
2011).
84

See Pethtel, supra note 78, at 23 (providing multiple examples of technologies created
by ITSA members); Connected Vehicle Insights: Trends in Machine-to-Machine
Communications, ITS AM., 2-6 (2011), http://www.itsa.org/knowledgecenter/te
chnologyscan (under “Current Connected Vehicle Insight Reports* under production,”
follow either the “PDF” or “HTML” hyperlink next to “Trends in Machine-to-Machine
Communications”) (discussing the growing field of machine-to-machine connected
devices including their application in the transportation sector).
85

See A Conversation with ITS America President David Hensing, 11 GLOBAL
POSITIONING & NAVIGATION NEWS, no. 11 (May 30, 2001); ITS America’s Fair
Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM., 1-3, http://www.itsa.org/images/mediac
enter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011); see also Connected Vehicles –
Next Generation ITS, ITS AM., http://www.itsa.org/forumstaskforcesworkinggroup
s/connectedvehicle (last updated Aug. 31, 2011).
86

See ITS America’s Fair Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM., 1,
http://www.itsa.org/images/ mediacenter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
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provide an example of how membership organizations across various
industries have made an effort to self-regulate on the issue of data security
and privacy protection.
III. THE VIRGINIAN LANDSCAPE
[23] While the Virginia Constitution expresses no right of privacy,
Article I, Section 10 protects individuals from general warrants for search
and seizure. 87 In addition, the courts in Virginia have decided a number of
cases that address the issue of the expectation of privacy, including Atkins
v. Commonwealth, which reiterated the standard for recognizing
expectations of privacy. 88 “[T]he test is whether the appellant objectively
had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and place of the
A court must “look to the totality of the
disputed search.” 89
circumstances” to determine whether an expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable. 90

2011) (“These principles are advisory, intended to educate and guide transportation
professionals . . . .”).
87

VA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to
seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.”).

88

Atkins v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).

89

Id. at 254 (quoting McCoy v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d. 383, 385 (Va. Ct. App.
1986)).
90

Id. These circumstances include:
whether the defendant has a possessory interest in . . . the place
searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place,
whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain
free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions
to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the
premises.
Id. (quoting McCoy, 343 S.E.2d at 385).

19

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue1

[24] A number of cases involving transportation apply this
reasonableness standard, most notably as it relates to automobile searches
using advanced technology. 91 In the decision announced in Foltz v.
Commonwealth, the court established that the placement of a Global
Position Tracking (GPS) tracking device inside the bumper of the
defendant’s work van did not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or
“seizure” and did not violate the defendant’s privacy rights. 92 Likewise,
the court in Londono v. Commonwealth applied the standard in the area of
public transportation. 93 Here, the court held that an individual, while
traveling on a train “does not enjoy the same expectation of privacy as he
would at home.” 94 The court went on to explain that, although “occupants
of train roomettes may properly expect some degree of privacy,” for
Fourth Amendment purposes, “it is less than the reasonable expectations
that individuals rightfully possess in their homes or their hotel rooms.” 95
Also, because “passengers in sleeping cars are repeatedly subject to
inquiry and oversight by conductors and other railroad personnel,” and
“[i]ntrusions such as these necessarily reduce privacy interests,” an
individual should not expect the same degree of privacy had they decided
to stay at home. 96
[25] The General Assembly of Virginia has enacted several important
statutes relating to privacy interests regarding the collection of data by the
91

See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 273 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938,
945 (6th Cir. 1980).
92

See Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 287, 289, 290, 292-93 (Va. Ct. App.
2010).
93

See Londono v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 641 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).

94

Id. at 650 (citing United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1988)).

95

Id. (quoting Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 853).

96

Id. at 650-51 (quoting Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 853).
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government. 97 The Government Data Collection and Dissemination
Practices Act (“Data Collection Act”) recognizes that “an individual’s
privacy is directly affected by the extensive collection, maintenance, use
and dissemination of personal information” and acknowledges the vast
amount of information now accessible electronically. 98 As such, the Data
Collection Act provides a cause of action for using data or acquiring it
improperly, as well as allowing for attorneys fees and injunctive relief for
individuals adversely impacted per the Act, thus taking steps to ensure the
protection of privacy of individuals throughout the Commonwealth. 99
Section 2.2-3800 provides guidelines for recordkeeping agencies of the
Commonwealth including: prohibition against secret record keeping
systems, prohibition against collection unless there is clear notice stated in
advance, and prohibition from collecting personal information except as
explicitly or implicitly authorized by law. 100 The Data Collection Act also
provides individuals an effective way to correct any collected information
about them. 101 In at least one reported case, the legal standard for the
government’s authority to collect personal data was raised. 102 However,
because the Virginia Supreme Court determined the Act did not cover the
particular government entity, it was not necessary for the court to reach
further into an interpretation of the statute. 103
97

See generally Virginia Freedom of Information Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3700 to 3714 (2008); Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-3800 to -3809 (2008); Virginia Computer Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.2-152.1 to -152.14 (2009).
98

VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800.

99

See id. § 2.2-3809.

100

Id. § 2.2-3800(C).

101

Id. § 2.2-3800(C)(7).

102

See Carraway v. Hill, 574 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Va. 2003).

103

Id. at 276-77 (citing Connell v. Kersey, 547 S.E.2d 228, 231-32 (Va. 2001))
(establishing that although the city treasurer provided a newspaper reporter with
information from a city treasury employee’s employment file, Government Data
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[26] In the context of motor vehicles, the 2011 Session of the General
Assembly considered and passed S. 946, a bill to augment Section 46.2844, which allows local school systems to install and operate a video
monitoring system on school buses in order to detect drivers who pass a
stopped school bus in violation of Section 46.2-859. 104 The statute defines
a “video monitoring system” as a system “with one or more camera
sensors and computers that produces live digital and recorded video” of
motor vehicles which passed school buses as they stop for students. 105
The section also requires the system to record an image of the license plate
and the time, date, and location of the vehicle. 106
[27] The General Assembly, along with those other states who followed
California’s lead, 107 has enacted legislation regulating event data
recorders. 108 In particular, Section 46.2-1088.6 provides that only the
owner of the vehicle or one with the consent of the owner’s agent or legal
representative may access recorded data from a recording device. 109 The
statute defines “recording device” as “event data recorders (EDRs),
sensing and diagnostic modules (SDMs), electronic control modules
Collection and Dissemination Practices Act did not apply to a treasurer, “a constitutional
officer” who “is an independent public official [and] whose authority is derived from the
Constitution of Virginia even though the duties of the office may be prescribed by
statute”).
104

2011-838 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-844 (Supp. 2011)).
105

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-844(B) (Supp. 2011).

106

Id.

107

See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1972 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.35.030 (West Supp. 2011).
108

See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010).

109

Id. § 46.2-1088.6(B).
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(ECMs), automatic crash notification (ACN) systems, geographic
information systems (GIS), and any other device that records and
preserves data that can be accessed related to that vehicle.” 110
Nevertheless, this Section provides exceptions to the general rule requiring
consent by the owner or representative. 111 The statute allows for access to
recorded data: (1) if the owner or owner’s agent has a contract with a third
party subscription service that requires access to the device(s); (2) if a
licensed new motor vehicle dealer, or mechanic or technician requires
access to recorded data to perform ordinary diagnosing, servicing and
repair duties; (3) if the recorded data is accessed by an emergency
response provider and the data is used to perform emergency response
services; (4) if requested by authority of a court of competent jurisdiction;
and (5) if the data law enforcement accesses the data in the course of a
constitutionally permissible investigation, in accordance with the law
regarding searches and seizures. 112 While the statute makes clear the
scope of the permissible use of data retrieved from the recorder, there are
no civil or criminal liability provisions to protect the owner from
unauthorized use by “hacking in” to the data or by law enforcement acting
beyond the scope of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. 113
[28] In a pair of unpublished companion cases, Nininger v.
Commonwealth 114 and Dupree v. Commonwealth, 115 law enforcement
accessed the EDRs from a Hummer H3’s and a Chevy Avalanche “using a
110

Id. § 46.2-1088.6(A)(6).

111

See id. § 46.2-1088.6(B)(1)-(5).

112

Id.

113

See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088(B)(1)-(5).

114

Nininger v. Commonwealth, No. 0450-09-3, 2010 WL 1752572 (Va. Ct. App. May 4,
2010).
115

Dupree v. Commonwealth, No. 0519-09-3, 2010 WL 1752581 (Va. Ct. App. May 4,
2010).
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Crash Data Retrieval System connected to the diagnostic port of the
vehicle.” 116 The data showed that Nininger was “traveling at 37 mph and
never attempted to brake or swerve to avoid the blade of the backhoe” 117
and Dupree “was traveling at 38 mph and he applied his brakes a halfsecond before he collided with Nininger.” 118 Both defendants did not
specifically contest the admissibility of the EDR data. 119 These cases
suggest that EDR data may be used by law enforcement to search and
seize electronic evidence obtained from emerging technology. 120 The
court’s tacit acceptance of EDR data has created a variety of new legal
issues, which in turn requires new legislation to protect the privacy rights
of Virginia motor vehicle drivers. 121
[29] For example, Section 38.2-2212 provides that no insurer shall
refuse to renew a motor vehicle insurance policy because of the refusal of
an owner of a motor vehicle to provide access to recorded data from a
recording device as defined by Section 46.2-1088.6. 122 Section 38.22213.1 also provides that when an owner does deny access to recorded
data from a recording device, an insurer may not “reduce coverage,
116

Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3 n.3; Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3 n.3.

117

Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3.

118

Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3.

119

See Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572; Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581.

120

See Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 314 (“Courts, however, have manifested a
willingness to accept data collected by these [EDR] systems in civil cases as long as it
complies with the applicable evidentiary standard of ‘general acceptance’ as a legitimate
technology.”).
121

See, e.g., Kevin J. Powers, David Hasselhoff No Longer Owns the Only Talking Car:
Automotive Black Boxes in Criminal Law, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 289, 305-08 (2005)
(discussing the Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns implicated regarding the seizure
and admissibility of EDR evidence in criminal cases).

122

VA CODE ANN. § 38.2-2212(C)(1)(s) (2007); VA CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010).
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increase the insured’s premium, apply a surcharge, refuse to apply a
discount . . . place in a less favorable tier” or take other similar negative
action solely on the basis of the owner’s refusal to allow access to
recorded data. 123
[30] Vehicular tolling facilities have utilized emerging technology to
collect vehicular tolls in a faster, more efficient manner. 124 The use of
systems such as EZPASS to collect tolls by reading data from the front
windshield of the vehicle as it passes through a tolling facility has become
increasingly popular in Virginia and across the United States. 125 Not
surprisingly, the General Assembly has legislated in this area. 126 Section
46.2-819.1 provides for the installation and use of a photo-monitoring
system or an automatic vehicle identification system in certain toll
facilities. 127 This section provides that an “operator of any toll facility or
the locality within which such toll facility is located may install and
operate or cause to be installed and operated a photo-monitoring system or
automatic vehicle identification system, or both . . . .” 128 This affords the
toll operator the ability to “send an invoice or bill for unpaid tolls to the
registered owner of a vehicle as part of an electronic or manual toll
collection process . . . .” 129 Section 46.2-819.1 also provides that any data
123

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2213.1 (2007).

124

See Bob E. Lype, Employment Law and New Technologies: Emerging Trends
Affecting Employers, 47-MAY TENN. B.J. 20, 24 (2011) (“[T]he ‘EZPass’ system . . .
allows employees to pass toll gates on toll roads without stopping.”).
125

Cf. Ian Goldberg, Austin Hill & Adam Shostack, Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 407, 420 (2001) (“The [EZPass] system is coercive in nature, insofar as toll
systems become more efficient and failure to participate in the program results in a
substantial cost in time.”).
126

See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.1 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.5 (2010).

127

See VA. CODE ANN.§ 46.2-819.1(A).

128

Id.

129

Id.
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collected by these systems is “limited exclusively to that information that
is necessary for the collection of unpaid tolls,” and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, toll operators may not sell solicit, market for any
purpose, or disclose the data to any entity other than for toll collection
purposes. 130 Furthermore, it does not permit the data to be introduced as
evidence in a court of competent jurisdiction, unless the court action is for
determining a violation of Section 46.2-819.1. 131
[31] Finally, Section 46.2-819.5 provides for the use of photomonitoring or automatic vehicle identification systems in conjunction with
the usage of the Dulles Access Highway to determine violations of a
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority regulation regarding usage
of the highway for non-airport purposes. 132 The section has the same
requirements and exceptions for the usage of the data collected, including
photographs, microphotographs, and electronic images, as does Section
46.2-819.1 explained above. 133 It also requires the purging of data within
30 days after the collection and reconciliation of fees and penalties. 134
[32] Although Virginia’s statutes direct the purging of data collected by
these automated systems no later than thirty days after collection and
reconciliation of unpaid tolls, as is also the case of data collected by the
EDRs, 135 this use of emerging technology for transportation related
purposes directly impacts the extent to which an individual can expect to
maintain privacy while traveling. There also exists a greater potential for

130

Id. § 46.2-819.1(B).

131

Id.

132

VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.5 (2010).

133

Id. § 46.2-819.5 (B); see id. § 46.2-819.1.

134

Id. § 46.2-819.5(B).

135

Id. § 46.2-1088.6(A).
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improper use of this data by law enforcement, as compared to traditional
or non-technological methods. 136
IV. CONCLUSION
[33] The rapid advancement of technological innovation in all areas of
our society has created new opportunities for resolving the challenges of
the 21st century. We have faster and greater access to information in the
global village through use of the Internet and its applications. We also
have more developed methods for accessing goods and services
electronically. 137 In the transportation area, using technology has enabled
faster and greater access to services, the ability to transfer more quickly
from one mode to another, as well as more choices regarding which mode
can be accessed and when. 138
[34] These positive outcomes from technological innovation, however,
have their downsides, including the potential for abuse of the individual’s
privacy interests. 139 Faster access to transportation has encouraged the
electronic collection and maintenance of personal and vehicle data. 140 The
136

See generally Don Oldenburg, The Snoop in Your Coupe, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003,
at A01 (discussing concerns about use of EDR by law enforcement).

137

See, e.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2011);
ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).

138

See Carla Saulter, Does Better Technology Equal Better Transportation Choices?,
CHOOSE YOUR WAY BELLEVUE BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011, 11:50 AM),
http://www.chooseyourwaybellevue.org/blog/2011/03/does-better-technology-equalbetter-transportation-choices/.
139

See Patrick R. Mueller, Comment, Every Time You Brake, Every Turn You Make--I'll
Be Watching You: Protecting Driver Privacy in Event Data Recorder Information, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 135, 166-67 (discussing the high value of EDR to parties involved in Civil
and Criminal litigation).

140

See Noam Cohen, As Data Collecting Grows, Privacy Erodes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/technology/16link.html (discussing services
such as Zipcar and go520).
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ability to employ symbiotic technological devices has improved the
government’s ability to enforce the laws and investigate accidents to
determine responsibility and/or liability. 141 In the wake of the events of
9/11 and the increase in concern about national security, 142 individual
rights have often been violated in protection of the homeland.
[35] This discussion has outlined instances where advancing technology
has pushed the limits of personal privacy. The Supreme Court of the
United States found in the United States Constitution a “zone of
privacy,” 143 but has since created a body of law that sets forth no clear
pattern as to the limits of an individual’s reasonable expectation to protect
their privacy, or the acceptable limits of government action. Congress has
enacted legislation, executive branch agencies have promulgated
regulations, and industry groups have set standards to guide the access,
handling, and disposition of personal information collected through
transportation-related technology. 144 Generally, these standards make
strong efforts to minimize violations of personal privacy and set forth
clear guidelines governing the release and dissemination of personal
data. 145 However, these patchwork guidelines often permit the release of
personal information, otherwise thought to be private, to achieve public

141

See Oldenburg, supra note 136 (providing multiple examples of where EDR was used
to convict criminals for driving related offenses).
142

See Bennie G. Thompson, The National Counterterrorism Center: Foreign and
Domestic Intelligence Fusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy, 6 U. PITT. J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 6, paras. 1, 7, 14 (2006).
143

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

144

See, e.g., Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 563.1, 563.2 (2010).
145

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725.
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purposes such as protecting the health and safety of traveling
individuals. 146
[36] The legal landscape in Virginia reflects the federal standards for
EDRs, 147 and yet remains distinctive through legislation such as The
Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act. 148 In at
least two cases, Virginia courts allowed data from EDR equipment
admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding, 149 and held that travelers
on public transportation modes have a lesser expectation of privacy than
they do in hotel rooms or at home. 150 Virginia permits the use of
symbiotic technological applications, photo-monitoring systems, and
automatic vehicle identification systems to collect tolls and enforce
transportation regulations. 151 However, with the exception of a handful of
limited purposes, Virginia permits public disclosure of personal data. 152
[37] Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court of the United States,
Congress and federal agencies, and Virginia’s courts and lawmakers have
recognized the challenges that emerging technological applications have
brought and have permitted this technology to be utilized in a number of
ways, including law enforcement, while at the same time attempting to
146

See id. § 2721(b); ITS America’s Fair Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM.,
2, http://www.itsa.org/images/mediacenter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2011).
147

See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010).

148

See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800to -3809 (2008 & Supp. 2010).

149

See Dupree v. Commonwealth, No. 0519-09-3, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3, *3 n.3 (Va.
Ct. App. 2010); Nininger v. Commonwealth, No. 0450-09-03, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3,
*3 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
150

See Londono v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E. 2d 641, 650-51 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).

151

See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-819.1, -819.5 (2010 & Supp. 2011).

152

See id.
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ensure secure data collection. 153 Although methods to protect personal
data have been legally prescribed, lawmakers should recognize that the
same technological innovations and applications that enabled society to
advance may also hinder these protections and violate an individual’s
legally protected privacy interests. 154
[38] For example, electronic tolling systems are “rife with privacy
risks” and that anyone with a transponder reader can “steal the ID number
off transponders . . . through the windshield [of a parked car], put the data
on their device[ ] and pass through . . . tolls for free, with the victim
paying the bill.” 155 Moreover, it is common to “hack” into databases or
“phish” into email accounts to steal personal data, including credit card
and bank account numbers. As is usually the case, the law lags behind
cutting edge innovations that impact individual rights. 156 Emerging
technology in transportation proves no exception. 157
[39] This article supports the conclusion that, in the face of technology
advancements, greater efforts by the Congress and the General Assembly
of Virginia have protected the personal privacy of the individual by
prescribing that collected data must be kept secure and not disseminated

153

See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1, 563.2 (2010). See generally supra Parts II-III.
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See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (imposing limits on the
government’s power to use thermal imaging technology to “shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy” by conducting a warrantless search of a home).
155

Elinor Mills, Hacking Electronic-Toll Systems, CNET NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008, 4:37 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/ 8301-1009_3-10009353-83.html.
156

See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens . . . has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”).
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See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 447 (N.Y. 2009) (indicating that advances in
GPS monitoring and other technological innovations call for judicial oversight to mitigate
the significant risk of abuse).
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except for narrow purposes. 158 A second conclusion purports that, as
technology is utilized to enforce speed limits and red light violations,
collect tolls and enforce roadway restrictions, the public will challenge
those intrusions. As our system requires, the outcomes to these challenges
is still unfolding in the courts. 159 One thing is clear however, enforcement
of the law through more sophisticated technological methods causes the
individuals affected to bristle at the government’s broader reach. 160 As
one motorist, who received a ticket in the mail from Ridgeland, South
Carolina—a town that employs speed cameras to enforce the speed limit
on I-95 said: “I just don’t think it’s right. If you get a ticket you should be
stopped by an officer, know you have been stopped and have an
opportunity to state your case.” 161
[40] While traveling in the “circulatory system” 162 of the United States,
is the right of privacy sacrificed for the health and convenience of the
transportation system? Has transportation technology struck the final nail
into the coffin of personal privacy? This article has shown that our legal
institutions, which at times seem poised to summon the hearse, must
continually respond to a public that heralds individual liberties and
demands that privacy rights remain recognized, placed on life support, and
protected.
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See Bruce Smith, I-95 Cameras Snap Speeders, Spark Controversy, MSNBC.COM
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